Trump looks set to bring shift in US approach to allies, North Korea, diplomacy, tariffs
Seoul: Under his America First leitmotif, incoming US President Donald Trump appears poised to bring a shift in the United States’ approach to the alliance with South Korea, North Korea’s unabated nuclear threats, trade and other key issues.
Trump will take the oath of office in the Capitol Rotunda on Monday as the US 47th president amid expectations that he will employ a diplomatic playbook that seeks to curtail America’s costly overseas engagement, pressure allies to shoulder more security burden and redress US trade deficits for the sake of American interests.
His swearing-in comes as South Korea is reeling from the aftermath of now-impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol’s botched martial law bid last month, with the current period of political uncertainty feared to weaken Seoul’s hands in policy coordination with the Trump administration.
In his second term, Trump’s America First credo is expected to be an overarching theme of his administration’s policy formulation and implementation given that he has named stalwart loyalists for Cabinet posts in the absence of the “axis of adults” that can help stably guide the US’ foreign and security policy.
US allies like South Korea have now been bracing for the return of Trump’s perceived transactional foreign policy approach — a far cry from the Biden administration’s formula centring on rebuilding and cementing a network of allies and partners as America’s “greatest strategic asset.”
“We know the transition from the Biden to the Trump administration represents a significant shift in how the United States approaches allies,” Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific Security at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, told Yonhap News Agency via email. “There is a time for strenuous demands on allies, but now is not that time for South Korea.”
In South Korea, concerns have persisted that Trump could demand Seoul raise its financial contributions to the stationing of the 28,500-strong US Forces Korea (USFK), though a new cost-sharing deal for the 2026-30 period was signed last year.
Trump has already asserted the need for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states to spend 5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence — much higher than the current 2 per cent guideline of the transatlantic alliance.
In his campaign remarks in October, Trump called South Korea a “money machine” and claimed that South Korea would be paying US$10 billion a year for the upkeep of USFK if he was in the White House. Under the new cost-sharing deal, Seoul is to pay 1.52 trillion won ($1.04 billion) in 2026, up from 1.4 trillion won in 2025.
Trump’s picks for Cabinet posts underscored that they are in sync with Trump’s view on NATO and other allies when they appeared at recent Senate confirmation hearings.
“I think there’s been broad acknowledgement across Europe and across multiple administrations, both Republican and Democrat, that our NATO partners … these are rich, advanced economies, need to contribute more to their own defence and ultimately to the NATO partnership as well,” Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio said.
The Florida senator added that what matters is for the US not just to have defence allies, but to have “capable” allies that are able to defend their own region.
When it comes to diplomacy toward North Korea, expectations remain high that Trump might seek to resume his direct diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, given that on the stump, he repeatedly boasted about his personal ties with the reclusive leader.
During his time in office, Trump employed a direct leader-to-leader approach with the North, leading to three in-person meetings with Kim, including the first-ever bilateral summit in Singapore in 2018, though serious nuclear talks have been stalled since the no-deal summit in Hanoi in February 2019.
Trump’s recent personnel choices have added to growing expectations for a rekindling of diplomacy between the US and the North.
Earlier this month, Trump picked William Harrison — an aide, who was involved in planning summits with the North Korean leader during his first term — as an assistant to the president and deputy chief of staff for operations.
Last month, he named former Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell as his presidential envoy for special missions that he said cover “some of the hottest spots” around the world, including North Korea, while tapping Alex Wong, who was engaged in working-level nuclear talks with the North, as his principal deputy national security adviser.
Still, it remains to be seen whether Pyongyang has an appetite to reengage with Washington as it now relies on Russia for food, fuel, security assistance and other forms of support in the wake of its support for Moscow’s protracted war in Ukraine.
In Seoul, concerns have persisted that with Yoon’s suspension from official duties and the absence of a fully elected president in office, policy coordination with the Trump administration could weaken, or South Korea could be sidelined or bypassed during Trump’s diplomacy toward Pyongyang.
This is a key line of concern over the future trajectory of the Seoul-Washington alliance under Trump as the political turmoil continues in the Asian country currently led by acting President Choi Sang-mok.
“This is a tale of two allies on different tracks. The US will be starting a new government that will move at 100 miles per hour starting January 21. Trump will be signing EOs (executive orders) on all sorts of issues,” Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Yonhap News via email.
“Meanwhile, South Korea is stuck in neutral gear, not moving forward, and politically paralysed by the impeachment crisis. It is imperative that the adjudication of the case be done promptly and without partisan bickering. The longer the delay in resolving the situation — however it is resolved — the more disadvantageous to the alliance,” he added.
Frank Aum, a former senior Pentagon adviser on Korea, said the lack of certainty and direction in Seoul’s foreign policy might increase the likelihood for the Trump administration to take greater initiative on the alliance and North Korea policy.
“A stronger, more legitimate ROK president would be in the best position to advocate for ROK interests, especially in instances where Washington and Seoul are not on the same page,” Aum told Yonhap via email. ROK stands for South Korea’s official name, the Republic of Korea.
Trump’s unconventional, uncertainty-laced brand of diplomacy has been what keeps allies and partners on edge.
Recently, Trump took them by surprise when he refused to rule out using military or economic coercion to retake the canal that Panama took control of in 1999 and acquire Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory — a move that some say has laid bare an expansionist facet of his foreign policy.
Nam Chang-hee, a political science professor at Korea’s Inha University, interpreted Trump’s move on the Panama Canal and Greenland in a broader geopolitical context, saying the new president looks set to conduct a global “chess game” against China, a rival that has steadily been striving to expand its sphere of influence.
In the midst of the intensifying rivalry with China, Trump would come to grips with the strategic value of South Korea, a capable treaty ally home to major US Army and Air Force installations in close proximity to China’s mainland.
“Taken together in a broader scheme of things, I don’t think that the South Korea-US relationship would waver significantly during the Trump administration, compared with the NATO alliance,” Nam said. “If the defence cost issue is not handled wisely, it could become a source of friction or lead to a dissonance between the allies in a microscopic light, although the strategic value of South Korea would improve given the Sino-US chess game.”
Some observers construed Trump’s move on the Panal Canal and Greenland as another indication of the new US president giving short shrift to international norms or institutions and aggressively tripling down on his America First agenda.
“I think that it would become difficult to expect the role of America’s global leadership, and my concern is that in a post-Trump era, things might proceed in a similar way,” Kim Tae-hyung, professor of international politics at Soongsil University, said.
On trade, Trump is poised to introduce new tariffs on all imported goods — a measure that would also affect South Korea’s trade with the world’s largest economy. He has pledged to slap blanket tariffs of 10 to 20 per cent on all imports and threatened to impose tariffs of up to 60 per cent on Chinese goods.
During his Senate confirmation hearing this month, Treasury Secretary nominee Scott Bessent said that under the incoming administration, tariffs will be used for remedying unfair trade practices by China and other countries as well as for negotiations.
Wendy Cutler, vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and former negotiator of the South Korea-US free trade agreement, said that Seoul needs to signal to Trump Seoul’s efforts to help reduce America’s trade deficit and pitch itself as a crucial partner based on a story of Korean businesses’ substantial investment in the US.
“Even though a trade deficit can’t be turned around overnight, I think that Korea could signal that it takes this seriously and is taking steps, including efforts to buy more US goods and services and export less to the United States, that it’s taking these steps in an effort to help bring the deficit down,” Cutler said in a recent interview with Yonhap.
